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Evolutionary economists have tended to assess firms and industries separately, 
neglecting the role of their interaction in the process of economic growth and 
development.  We trace the separation of firms and industries to Marshall, whose 
industrial analysis by means of the representative firm formalizes population thinking 
as “thin” means of relating firms and industries.  Penrose avoids the industry concept 
by focussing on heterogeneous firms, while Young and Steindl develop mundane 
explanations of firms’ relations within groups, locating the impetus for growth in a 
poorly understood environment.  We conclude that evolutionary economics should 
revisit firms’ boundaries, not in the sense of explaining the existence of firms, but in a 
relating and communicating sense in which boundaries signify selective means of 
relations with others.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Metcalfe (2007a, p. 2) argues that while Marshall ‘is routinely presented as a founder 
of modern neoclassical economics’, he should properly be considered ‘as a major 
figure in a thread of evolutionary reasoning that explores the restless, dynamic nature 
of modern capitalism, a thread that begins with Adam Smith and leads on through 
Marx to Schumpeter and Hayek’. In particular, Metcalfe points to the Principles of 
Economics (Marshall, 1920), and Industry and Trade (Marshall, 1921) as providing 
an analysis in which there is clear focus on the self-transforming as well as self-
organizing nature of capitalism. We concur with Metcalfe’s assessment and argue that 
modern evolutionary economics would benefit from incorporating elements of 
Marshall’s analysis, along with elements from the analysis of some later economists 
who extended or criticized his method. 
The particular aspect of Marshall’s analysis on which we focus here is the 
relationship between firms and the industry in which they operate. Marshall 
understands that heterogeneity among firms can lead through internal economies of 
scale to domination of an industry by a firm that acquires an early advantage. 
However, he then argues that family-owned firms have built-in life spans and that 
external economies can explain how the division of labour in the economy continues 
to expand nonetheless, thereby boosting productivity. Spillovers of knowledge in the 
environment of the “industrial college” allow an industry to progress while individual 
firms go through their limited life cycles.  
The mix of internal and external economies and, particularly, the linkage 
between firm and industry created through the analytical device of the representative 
firm has been problematic for Marshall’s followers. The relationship is simplified 
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and, arguably, emasculated by Pigou (1920), who changes from the representative 
firm to the equilibrium firm, and then by Robinson (1931), who replaces the 
equilibrium firm with the optimum firm. In the process, Marshall’s concept of an 
industry as a forest composed of growing and declining firms thereby loses its self-
ordering and self-transforming nature and is replaced by a mature lifeless plantation 
of uniform and stationary members. 
We seek lessons for an evolutionary explanation of industries and firms by 
examining the analysis of Marshall and selected later economists who reject the 
emasculated form of the representative firm. Our discussion compares and contrasts 
the approach of Marshall to three successors who deal with the theory of the growth 
of the firm and its implications for the evolution of industries: Young (1928), Penrose 
(1956, 1959, 1960), and Steindl (1945a, 1945b, 1952). These authors each take issue 
with some aspects of Marshall’s approach, but in the process provide important 
pointers that we argue can be used to extend and deepen Marshall’s original insights. 
Firms and industries have been central to research in modern evolutionary 
economics, at least since the modelling by Nelson and Winter (1982). In Nelson and 
Winter competition is a dynamic process in which firms choose between innovation 
and imitation strategies with stochastic outcomes. More varied and complex networks 
for knowledge transfer and co-evolution have been added, involving many more 
participants, including governments, universities and scientific organizations of 
various types, (Malerba, 2006). However, there is a certain tendency to deal with 
industries (as in Malerba 2006) or firms (as in Hodgson and Knudsen 2004, 2006) in 
isolation or, at least, without allowing full scope for their interaction in the process of 
economic development. Evolutionary economists can learn important lessons from 
Marshall, Young, Steindl and Penrose that will aid in the endeavour to bring firms and 
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2. Marshall’s Vision of Firms and Industries 
 
In this section we focus on three related aspects of Marshall’s analysis of economic 
change: (1) the role of the firm and the industry in economic development, (2) the 
tension between internal and external economies, and (3) the dimensions of ongoing 
corporations and their internal accumulation of capital and knowledge. We then 
discuss Marshall’s use of the representative firm in his analysis of value and its 
subsequent re-interpretation in the neoclassical analysis of firms and markets in 
equilibrium. 
The overarching argument in the Principles of Economics (Marshall, 1920) is 
that the basis of economic development is found in firms in relation to other firms, 
rather than in firms considered in isolation. Knowledge diffuses through localized 
industries, which act as industrial colleges with knowledge of products and productive 
techniques being ‘in the air’ (Marshall, 1920, p. 217). Knowledge leaks out of its 
contexts and is communicable through personal contacts among rivals, suppliers, 
training institutes, trade journals, customers and so on. While the communication of 
productive knowledge cannot be taken for granted, channels of communication are 
developed and firms locate in proximity to their rivals to participate and benefit in that 
industry’s activities. From each firm’s perspective, capital includes both internal 
organization and external connections (Marshall, 1920, p. 377). 
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Marshall describes innovation as being gradual, and though a brief period of 
accumulating knowledge internally might allow one firm to get a start on others, the 
high likelihood of leakage means that internal accumulation is just enough to provide 
relatively weak incentives for innovation on a piecemeal basis. Analytically, 
innovative capability (understood as an indirect or higher-order and cumulative 
ability) resides to a significant extent in an industry at large (with the broader 
industrial college among its functions), with limited chance for firms to develop their 
individual innovative capability. So firms build on others’ contributions with as much 
likelihood as building on their own. Innovations might as well be undertaken through 
random draws, as in the simulation of economic development in industries by Nelson 
and Winter (1982). 
Analytically, Marshall’s explanation of economic development needs 
industries as well as firms, and the two need to be understood as distinct and 
interacting units of analysis. Though distinct, firms are not easily isolated as they are 
identified in part through sets of external connections, including gaining access to 
external economies (or economies specific to that localized industry), which may 
belong to no-one in particular, or may emanate from publicly or communally-funded 
research and teaching, such as with universities.  Firms are irreducibly heterogeneous, 
with heterogeneity again including firms’ sets of external connections, but 
heterogeneity is analytically within the industry’s bounds so presenting the possibility 
of systemic coherence (Potts, 2001). To re-iterate, firms’ bounds are both relative to 
one another and are secured in principle through the domination of internal economies 
by external economies.   
Marshall’s firms are heterogeneous at the very least because each has a unique 
and networked position relative to other firms.  Co-incidentally, a unique position is 
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reflected in what we now term a firm’s (internal) resources and capabilities, which 
develop as firms cope with their unique settings (Richardson, 1972, 1975; Loasby, 
1998).  Analytically, heterogeneity can be translated into variation among firms, with 
the trajectory of such an argument being towards organizing firms into industry 
populations.  Hence, variation may be interpreted statistically.   
Bounds – additional to those provided by the industry itself – on heterogeneity 
are inferred in Marshall’s system from each firm’s presumed likely demise, which 
reinforces the domination of internal economies by external economies (Marshall, 
1920, p. 287). The demise of firms is connected with an intergenerational model in 
which family firms form, flourish and decline. For instance, third-generation 
managers are presumed not to have acquired the personal motivation, commitment 
and vigour of the founding generation. They do not enthuse their employees with 
similar drive, commitment and vigour, especially in adopting and adapting to 
innovations that are abroad in their industry. This leads to malaise and failures to 
acquire new knowledge and techniques or failure to build upon these if acquired 
(Marshall, 1920, p. 299). Marshall’s argument is not solely motivational. He also 
implies that firms develop with respect to a particular vintage of technology and then 
find it difficult to adapt to the newer technologies upon which new entrants base their 
production so there is a corresponding dimension of core rigidities or competence and 
technology traps.  In sum, bounds on heterogeneity make it easier to perform an 
analytical translation of heterogeneity to variation and hence to population thinking of 
firms in industries.   
Marshall’s framework reflects his expository strategy of “careful ambiguity”, 
such that large and small firms, which coexist in industries, can also be reflected in 
his theory of firms and industries. Productivity improvements are also acquired easily 
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as leakages from outside the industry of focus and in turn leak to other firms. 
Otherwise, if they emanate only from the industry of focus, we face the awkward 
question of why most firms in this system absorb the external changes easily but no 
one firm initiates any innovating activities of a more radical nature. The means of 
transition are expected to be orderly so that many firms can adapt the changes from 
elsewhere without too much disruption to the industry. 
Despite irreducible heterogeneity among firms in industries, competition 
among firms prevents one firm getting an insurmountable lead and benefiting from 
faster accumulation or internal economies.1 The representative firm can stand for the 
industry because analytically Marshall places limits on – and so constructs a concept 
of – variation across firms in the industry.  Variation’s necessary limits are in part 
caused by the transmission of knowledge, in part by the lack of opportunities for 
internal economies, and in part by limits in intergenerational managerial vigour. Also, 
important is the imperfection of markets, especially capital markets, but including 
labour and product markets. This imperfection limits the size of the firm in real time, 
even when there are internal economies of scale. 
The limits on variation give Marshall’s representative firm some potential 
grounding when he comes to consider the determinants of the supply price of an 
industry. Here he notes,  
 
We shall have to analyse carefully the normal cost of producing the 
commodity, relatively to a given aggregate volume of production; 
and for this purpose we shall have to study the expenses of a 
representative producer for that aggregate volume. On the one hand 
we will not want to select that new producer just struggling into 
 9
business, who works under many disadvantages, and has to be 
content for a time with little or no profits, but who is satisfied with 
the fact that he establishing a connection and taking the first steps 
towards building up a successful business; nor on the other hand, 
shall we want to take a firm which by exceptionally long-sustained 
ability and good fortune has got together a vast business, and well-
ordered workshops that give it superiority over almost all its 
rivals…. Thus, a representative firm is in a sense an average firm. 
(Marshall, 1920, pp. 264-5, italics in original) 
 
The representative firm, which represents or at least stands in for the firms 
that are interacting in a particular industry, is a wonderful and infuriating instance of 
Marshall’s careful ambiguity.  It hints at population thinking, by which we mean the 
representation of a set of heterogonous firms in an industry as if they could be 
isolated and ordered on the basis of some critical characteristics (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977).  At the same time, we know that this isolation and ordering is – to 
say the least – difficult to perform empirically because firms exist and are ongoing in 
significant part through their relationships with one another.  In other words, firms 
continue to exist because they continue to co-exist.  Notwithstanding the empirical 
difficulties, the representative firm attracts our attention because its representative 
quality derives from its centrality in the notional distribution, and mere mention of a 
distribution implies a translation of our understanding of the group of firms from 
heterogeneity to industry and then to population.2   
If internal economies are substantial and managerial vigour is sustained, the 
process of accumulation together with down-sloping cost curves over normal zones of 
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production, even for one firm, leads to the break down of Marshall’s theoretical and 
systemic account of industrial activity and development.3 Internal economies come to 
dominate external economies. That is, firms with lower costs can devote resources to 
Schumpeterian process innovations, such as establishing professional research and 
development functions, as well as to innovations in products and physical capital 
(note that in the citation above, Marshall refers to ‘well-ordered workshops’). Firms 
with lower costs no longer receive random innovation draws.  Rather, the draws are 
now biased in their favour (as in Steindl’s analysis of absolute concentration 
discussed below). Even if knowledge is still ‘in the air’, other members of the 
community now find it a little harder to make sense of, as the many small steps of 
connection start showing gaps, requiring bigger leaps among potential imitator-
innovators, or leaps that require the devotion of more and more accumulated 
resources (Cantner and Pyka, 1998).  An implication is that firms are less embedded 
in one another, though as a consequence we can anticipate that heterogeneity is more 
pronounced, as discussed by Penrose (1959).  Recognizing firms as irreducibly 
heterogeneous presents a procedural way of isolating firms, rather than dealing with 
them through the analytical means of population.4
Marshall’s view of firms, which provides essential grounding to his analysis, 
has strong empirical bases, though it may have become less valid as conditions 
changed during the late 19th century and beyond. Arguably, Marshall’s empirical 
understanding of trends in scientific management in business is accurate but not fully 
reflected in his theoretical framing of firms and their interdependence on one another. 
Hence, ‘The head of a large business can reserve all his strength for the broadest and 
most fundamental problems of his trade’, while ‘the small employer has not the time 
if he has the ability’ (Marshall, 1920, p. 284). He sees firms in an industry as moving 
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towards being roughly similar in size and accumulative capacity, based on the 
domination of external over internal economies and supported by a perceived lack of 
sustained vigour in managerial capability. This leads to Marshall’s (1920, pp. 315-
316) ‘trees in the forest’ metaphor, with the industry (forest) remaining seemingly 
unchanged as individual firms (trees) are born, grow, mature and die. The industry 
comes to the fore and establishes dynamic balance between progressive and declining 
firms, with today’s progressives inevitably becoming tomorrow’s decliners (Marshall, 
1920, p. 287). So Marshall can reasonably impose his model of the representative firm 
as a caricature of the industrial structure and processes, which can be described as in 
static equilibrium for the whole (Sutton, 2000). Of course, as Sraffa (1926) notes, 
Marshall also requires an assumption of rising costs for the representative firm to 
ensure competitive equilibrium for his theoretical system.  
Marshall (1920, pp. 302-304) devotes some pages to joint-stock companies 
and to the specialist task of management.  In Industry and Trade (Marshall, 1921) he 
refers to firms with ongoing accumulation of capital and knowledge, supported by 
scientific managerial techniques (Whitaker, 1999, provides a stimulating discussion). 
Scientific management is one part of the story of the large firm and also of the 
growing firm, which, if admitted by Marshall into his theoretical system, would 
undermine his explanation of economic development based on industries. Marshall’s 
(1921, p. 315) most telling remark is where he considers that it might be feasible for a 
firm to take over large amounts of economic activity, but that no one firm had 
demonstrated sufficient vigour and longevity, or had access to sufficient capital, for 
such an undertaking. Once again, Marshall is forced into having to rely on a 
phenomenon associated with the family-owned firms of the 19th Century to deal with 
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the modern corporation that was already taking hold at the beginning of the 20th 
Century (Penrose, 1952, p. 805).  
However, a second volume of Principles was not written and so the 
descriptive, informal and evolutionary or developmental insights in Industry and 
Trade have had precious little impact on economists’ later readings of the more 
formal analysis of Principles (Comin, 2000; Raffaelli, 2004).5 While ‘it all could be 
in Marshall’, we have arrived at no conclusions on what the ‘it’ is. Part of the problem 
is in applying Marshall’s insights to the subsequent changes in corporate form; 
changes that are supported by the co-evolution of scientific managerial techniques, 
stock markets and legal regulation of corporate governance; trends which he noticed. 
Modern neoclassical analysis has restricted the notion of the representative 
firm to provide theoretical precision, although the precision and formalism is not in 
the sense of evolution. The subtlety (and ambiguity) of Marshall’s arguments 
concerning the balance of internal and external economies and the declining 
intergenerational vigour of management have been progressively usurped by 
increasingly precise concepts that dismiss the importance of heterogeneity among 
firms for the purpose of analysing industry behaviour. Pigou (1920, p. 790) replaces 
the representative firm with the analytical construct of an ‘equilibrium firm’, which is 
defined as a firm that is in equilibrium whenever the industry is in equilibrium.6  
Robinson (1931, p.11) goes further and adopts the concept of an ‘optimum 
firm’, which is defined as ‘a firm operating at that scale at which in existing 
conditions of technique and organising ability it has the lowest average cost of 
production, when all those costs of production which must be covered in the long run 
are included.’ While Robinson clearly recognizes that his optimum firm may differ 
from Marshall’s concept of a representative firm, he argues ‘The optimum firm is 
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likely to result from the ordinary play of economic forces where the market is perfect 
and sufficient to maintain a large number of firms of optimum size.’ Robinson (1931, 
p.12) Technology then becomes the sole determinant of profit-maximizing firm size, 
at least as long as the market is sufficiently large to accommodate a reasonable 
number of firms and thereby prevent the emergence of market power. It is this 
conception of the representative firm that dominates modern textbook treatments of 
the theory of the firm and competition.7 It provides no basis for evolutionary analysis 
because there is no meaningful population (actualizations) and no meaningful set of 
connections among firms (knowledge structure).8   
 
 
3.  Allyn Young’s Reinterpretation of External Economies 
 
The domination of internal economies by external economies is the main means of 
coherence empirically among firms and between firms and the industry as Marshall 
wrestles with the possibility of the differential and cumulative growth of some firms. 
Young (1928) develops the arguments of Smith and Marshall further in explaining 
how the industry itself could grow, thereby subtly altering the analytical focus from 
firms that are connected to one another, to the group of firms (Richardson, 1975, p. 
352). For Young, external economies (beyond a particular industry) provide the direct 
impetus for economic growth, whereas for Marshall the connection was indirect, in 
preserving competition between firms in a particular industry as the means of growth. 
Following Young (1928, p. 528),  
 
 14
Although the internal economies of some firms producing, let us say, 
materials or appliances may figure as the external economies of other 
firms, not all the economies which are properly to be called external can 
be accounted for by adding up the internal economies of all the separate 
firms. 
 
In Young’s sense, some economies “belong” initially and distinctly to firms, but seep 
out to others in an industrial setting by deliberate and knowledgeable imitation (White 
2002).   
Whereas with Marshall the processes of internal and external economies are 
intimately related as firms come to imitate one another as a normal practice, Young 
introduces something of schism between types of external economies by placing 
greater emphasis on the additional possibility of novelty and productivity gains from 
outside the industry of focus. Firms can gain internal economies through adapting to 
an increasing output, but are within circumscribed bounds. Internal economies can 
arise, for instance, where managers prioritize coordination while planning to adapt to 
higher levels of output. External economies are in a firm’s environment, implying that 
firms have little control or influence over these. In Young’s argument we know only a 
little of why there is an increase in output, even though plans are made to adjust to it. 
Hence, ‘out beyond, in that obscurer field from which derives its external economies, 
changes of another order are occurring. New products are appearing, firms are 
assuming new tasks, and new industries are coming into being’ (Young 1928, p. 528).  
Young is much clearer than Marshall in referring to boundaries that distinguish the 
industry and its environment. 
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Young describes the capture by firms of external economies in prosaic terms, 
implying similar rather than different and uneven understandings among firms. The 
most clearly understood part of economic development for Young, drawing from 
Marshall and also Smith, is also the part that features incremental changes, as firms 
adapt to production at a larger scale through adapting their internal managerial 
procedures to new means of production. The adaptive processes can be uneven and 
disruptive but work themselves out in ways that can be compared among all surviving 
firms. For example, adaptation could be through firms in a different or counterpart 
industry producing higher-order industrial goods (fixed capital), with the capital 
goods being easily applicable and absorbable for many firms working at similar levels 
of productive and absorptive capacity.9 In short, and from each firm’s perspective, 
changes in scale are established somewhere else and most firms adapt quite easily. A 
Marshallian twist is that opportunities arise for new entrants to replace older firms 
that lack the motivation and vigour to adapt.  
Young’s reinterpretation of external economies, now external to the industry, 
provides a “cleaner” means of identifying firms individually because an important 
source of external economies is from ‘that obscurer field’; the environment, which is 
necessarily poorly understood.10 Further, firms establish their identities within a 
competitive group rather than an industry.  “Competitive group” implies clear-cut 
connections between firms through strategic interaction, rather than the complex co-
creation of external economies.11  If the now mainly competitive relationships 
between firms in a competitive group can be interpreted as orthogonal to the 
development of the firms or the group, the translation of heterogeneous firms into a 







4.  Steindl’s External Limits to the Growth of Firms 
 
In his discussion of the determinants of firm size, Steindl (1945b, p. 3) starts by 
criticizing Marshall’s use of the representative firm. He notes that according to 
Marshall, ‘The limitation to the size of the representative firm, to sum up, is due to the 
limits of the market and, is obviously assumed, to the large scale economies becoming 
less important from a certain size on.’ Steindl (1945b, p.10) rejects this admittedly 
overly simplistic interpretation of Marshall’s view of the determinants of firm size, 
instead arguing that small and large firms coexist with a ‘general advantage of the 
bigger firm.’ (italics in the original). 
Steindl then addresses the co-existence of near-monopoly capital alongside 
entrepreneurial and small businesses.12 In effect, Steindl is dealing with the 
consequences of Marshall’s inability to develop a theoretical framework that can 
accommodate large firms and growing firms. Steindl’s explanation is clearly 
connected to that of Young (1928). Steindl inherits Young’s reinterpretation of 
internal and external economies, but includes capital market imperfection, greater 
variety among firms in an industry codified as variation in asset size, and 
indivisibilities in innovations embodied in capital goods.13
Steindl (1945a, 1945b, pp. 13-18) recognizes that entrepreneurs demand a risk 
premium on investments with uncertain returns to compensate for exposure to 
bankruptcy and for the risk associated with variance in returns. The risk premium 
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increases with the amount of finance required relative to the firm’s own capital.14 
This means that the ability of firms to expand their productive capacity through the 
acquisition of additional capital equipment is realistically limited at any point in time. 
Further, small and large firms face different opportunities for undertaking risk-bearing 
activities that offer higher rates of return, because economies of scale tend to raise the 
return to large units of capital above that of small units of capital.  
Recognition of differential opportunities for small and large business 
underpins Steindl’s subsequent examination of trends in concentration in Maturity 
and Stagnation in American Capitalism (Steindl, 1952). Here, the higher returns 
associated with economies of scale are combined with technical progress that brings 
improvements in productivity. However, improvements that occur at an uneven pace 
across firms in the same industry yield differences in the level of production cost, 
even among firms in the same size class.15
Firms with differing levels of production cost can coexist in the same industry 
due to imperfect competition, which leads to a general tendency towards price rigidity 
(Steindl, 1952, pp. 14-17).16 When prices are rigid, cost-reducing innovations lead in 
the first instance to an increase in the gross profit margins of the innovating firms. If 
the excess capacity of the firms with the lowest unit costs is within acceptable limits, 
these “progressive firms” have no incentive to cut prices. This allows high-cost firms, 
which are small or technologically backward, to survive, even when these “marginal 
firms” do not gain access to the cost-reducing technology. 
Steindl argues that investment by firms is dominated by internal accumulation 
(the financing of investment by retained earnings).17 Higher profits earned by 
progressive firms therefore lead to the expansion of their productive capacity relative 
to marginal firms. Eventually, the progressive firms become the largest firms in the 
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industry. If the number of marginal producers is constant, the industry is subject to 
relative concentration through the faster rate of growth and growing market share for 
the limited number of largest firms. However, a sufficiently high rate of growth of 
industry demand may attract new entrants, as small and relatively high-cost firms, 
thereby postponing the onset of relative concentration (Steindl, 1952, pp. 40-42). 
Steindl’s introduction of technological progress into the analysis loosens the 
finance constraint on firm growth. When technical progress raises the profits of 
progressive firms, the rates of internal accumulation and growth for these firms also 
increase. Given a predetermined rate of growth for industry demand, unplanned excess 
capacity eventually emerges as a result of the enlargement of capacity.18
Initially, progressive firms react to this unplanned excess capacity by engaging in 
aggressive price or selling competition. Marginal firms cannot match the aggressive 
competition due to their smaller gross profit margins, so they are forced to cede market 
share to the progressive firms. Some of them will go bankrupt and exit the industry. The 
reduced gross profit margins also dissuade entry of new firms into the industry. 
Concentration of the industry rises in absolute terms in the sense that, with the decline in 
the number and size of the marginal firms, there is a decline in the total sales of small 
firms and a rise in the total sales of large firms (Steindl, 1952, pp. 42-43). 
Steindl’s progressive firms are able to overcome the external constraint on 
growth posed by market demand growth below their rate of internal accumulation 
through the use of aggressive competition. However, this aggressive competition 
reduces the profit margins for themselves as well as for competing firms, hence 
reducing the rate of internal accumulation and the rate of firm growth throughout the 
industry. Thus, the environment influences firm growth, but only in a way that is 
intermediated through the development process of firms and of the competition 
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between firms. This is most clearly indicated when Steindl suggests that the 
increasing industry concentration eventually leads to an abatement of capacity 
expansion by the progressive firms, even though profits are available for investment. 
Managers of the progressive firms come to recognize that there is little possibility of 
capturing enough market share from the remaining competing firms to maintain 
growth in sales (Steindl, 1952, pp. 53-55). 
Steindl uses the division of firms into the two generic types of marginal and 
progressive to analyse competition as a process, as “an ideal pattern of competition”. 
In this pattern, the internal constraint on progressive firm growth of limited finance is 
sequentially replaced by the constraint of the presence of marginal firms in the market 
and then by the limited growth of the overall market. Only at this last step of the 
process, which Steindl terms “maturity”, is a type of equilibrium obtained (Steindl, 
1952, p.60). Thus, heterogeneity of firms drives the analysis in a manner that would 
be impossible with the representative firm as an ideal type, or even with the broader 
interpretation of Marshall’s notion of the representative firm as an average type. 
 
 
5. Penrose on Internal Limits to the Growth of Firms 
 
Penrose (1959, p. 2) is clear in her rejection of the idea that there is a firm size that is 
somehow best: ‘It is often presumed that there is a “most profitable” size of firm and 
that no further explanation than the search for profit is needed of how and why firms 
reach that size. Such an explanation of the size of firms will be rejected in this study.’ 
She goes on to state that, ‘it will be argued that size is but a by-product of the process 
of growth, that there is no “optimum”, or even most profitable, size of firm. As we 
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shall see, traditional theory has always had trouble with the limits to the size of firms, 
and I think we shall find the source of the trouble.’ 
Penrose shares with Steindl the notion that it is the growth of firms, rather than 
their size, which is limited under capitalism. However, where Steindl argues that firm 
growth is constrained by an external factor of limited access to capital, Penrose (1959) 
locates the constraint on growth within the firm. She argues that investment exhibits 
path dependence, with the increments to firm’s resources being specific to its unique 
growth trajectory. In other words, additional resources are of value as productive 
services only in a complementary and intangible connection with the firm’s 
established productive services drawn from its prior resources.  
Initially, the freed-up resources are most useful in expanding its current 
production. However, as the firm grows and develops, attractive opportunities for the 
employment of these productive services may be in areas outside the firm’s current 
area of specialization, defined in terms of either technologies or markets (Penrose, 
1959, pp. 109-111). Thus, in Penrose’s analysis even the size of the market for the 
firm’s original products poses no limit to firm growth as diversification is a likely 
outcome to the continued internal development of firms. 
The potential for diversification complicates the definition of the industry. 
Penrose makes no clear distinction between internal and external economies, probably 
because to her “external” is everything that is beyond the firm and its immediate 
network of suppliers and buyers. Indeed, because the firm has fuzzy boundaries, and a 
significant, though still fuzzy, boundary internally between the senior management 
team and the firm’s operations, it is difficult to establish meanings of “internal and 
external”.  Instead, Penrose (1959, pp, 99-102) acknowledges as ‘economies of 
growth’ the possibility of freely available productivity improvements, which can 
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emerge organically as by-products of the firm’s growth.  Penrose’s economies of 
growth, which are not divided into internal and external components, fulfil a 
comparable function and also share some of the characteristics of Marshall’s external 
economies because they have to be acquired and integrated into an overall managerial 
or entrepreneurial vision. Indeed, Loasby (1999) argues that Penrose is thoroughly 
Marshallian without really referring to Marshall. 
Penrose’s analysis of the development of productive knowledge is carried out 
primarily within firms, while acknowledging some role for resources that are close at 
hand to firms either in supply, in competitive relations or among product users. This is 
the closest that Penrose gets to industries.  Even this is more focused on connections 
of exchange rather than on interactions between firms that share productive 
techniques or other criteria for identifying industries.19 In fact, Penrose goes much 
further than Chamberlin (1933) in freeing her analysis, and so her heterogeneous 
firms, from the conflation of firms and industry in Marshall’s representative firm. Her 
heterogeneous firms are not even anchored to particular markets or industries. 
Penrose has a generic firm type, replacing the “representative firm” of 
neoclassical analysis with a “growing firm” in order to explain processes that are 
presumed to be common to all firms that are pursuing growth, but not determining in 
any particular case. Importantly, it is a distinct subset of special firms that pursue 
growth, so that Penrose’s generic firm type diverges sharply from Marshall’s notion 
of the representative firm as an average firm.  
All firms that seek to grow have the same general processes, but emerge from 
and are shaped by idiosyncratic historical paths. Firms develop different resources 
(which become so in connection with an entrepreneurial plan developed within the 
senior managerial team) and managers have different capabilities and outlooks; these 
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differences affect how the firms carry out their productive activities. Hence, free 
productive resources, which Marshall termed external economies, are still ‘in the air’, 
but there is a very limited group of individuals, including managers of the particular 
focal firm and perhaps other firms located in close proximity, that are in a position to 
devote other resources to interpreting and assimilating these, or which have 
opportunities of interpreting and assimilating these. Most of Marshall’s firms could 
absorb external, and more or less free, improvements to productivity quite easily.  
Penrose’s growing firms need managerial competence (which cannot be hired at short 
notice and with immediate effectiveness) and other resources to capture and direct the 
economies of growth. Further, the necessary incumbent managerial competence is 
available episodically as ongoing activities (selected in previous episodes) become 
routine, freeing up resources, particularly managerial resources. 
For Penrose (1959) the factor that limits the internal development and growth 
of the firm ultimately is the capacity of its management. She argues that, ‘Since the 
services from “inherited” managerial resources control the amount of new managerial 
resources that can be absorbed, they create a fundamental and inescapable limit to the 
amount of expansion that a firm can undertake at any time.’ (Penrose, 1959, p.48) 
Thus, managerial resources too can develop over time. Penrose views firms as 
repositories of resources, which include fixed capital alongside intangible resources, 
such as knowledge and routines, from among which managers can select and 
configure plans in the form of combinations of productive services. This neatly 
captures Penrose’s (1952) objections to biological analogies in economics, a 
cautionary point for modern evolutionary economics.   
Penrose (1959, pp. 107-108) pays attention to the relationship between firm, 
market and industry, and her discussion recognizes concepts such as diversification 
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and product to be inherently relative or ambiguous. All growing firms have unique 
bundles of resources from which managers configure sets of productive services 
(ibid., p. 77). Firms sell in markets by undertaking spending efforts that seek to build 
customer loyalty, but Penrose emphasizes that this does not mean a firm’s resources 
are tied to a particular market (ibid., pp. 116-118). Penrose is so successful in 
isolating firms from one another, and making the growth of firms dependent on 
accumulated capacities aligned with the entrepreneurial vision of its managerial team, 




6.  Lessons for Today’s Evolutionary Economics 
 
What are the lessons for modern evolutionary economics from the efforts of Marshall, 
Young, Steindl and Penrose? We start with a general observation about the nature of 
work of all four and then point to lessons regarding the treatment of firms and 
industries from each of the authors in turn. 
The general observation that links the theorizing of each of our authors is that 
their analyses are conducted in a specific empirical context. This distinguishes their 
work from that of most mainstream theorists after Marshall. Compare the rich mixture 
of empirical observation and theory in Marshall’s Principles to the high-level 
abstraction of subsequent theoretical tracts in mainstream economics, for example 
Hick’s (1946) Value and Capital, Samuelson’s (1947) Foundations of Economic 
Analysis or Varian’s (1992) Microeconomic Analysis. Young, Steindl and Penrose 
follow the Marshallian approach to theorizing, rather than participating in the 
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mainstream pursuit of a universal economic theory devoid of any historical or 
institutional specificity. Given that our authors all give due heed to historical and 
institutional context that is central to evolutionary economics, they belong to a group 
of what might be termed, empirical evolutionary economists, that goes back to Adam 
Smith and before. 
Lesson one comes from Marshall (1920 and 1921) and tells us to treat firms 
and industries as interdependent rather than focus on one and either ignore the other 
or treat it as derivative (as Nelson and Winter, 1982, do in simulating changes in 
industry concentration from stochastic innovation outcomes of individual firms). 
Marshall has each firm identified in part through its unique set of relations with other 
entities, including other firms as well as organizations such as universities and 
industrial journalism.  Relationships, or external connections, form part of each firm’s 
organizational capital and are means to new knowledge and understanding of 
industrial arts. Further, some external economies seem to belong to no one in 
particular, and rather are as if ‘in the air’.  While firms can of course be identified 
separately, they can owe their continuation to informal networks of relations with 
other entities, which also grants each firm a unique perspective on the network and so 
an irreducible basis of heterogeneity (Loasby, 2001, p. 408).   
This is a version of Granovetter’s (1985) ‘problem of embeddedness’, and of 
Uzzi’s (1997) empirically grounded ‘paradox of embeddedness’, in which firms 
cannot escape their networks of social and economic connections. Analytically, one 
way out, which might be feasible, is to recast embeddedness as nested selection, such 
that firms make selections of connections (that is choose or at least modify their own 
network position), and are then selected in part on the basis of network selections.  In 
other words, industries are understood as entities that emerge from the network 
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properties and interactions among a set of firms. However, Marshall’s firms are both 
partly constitutive of one another and also of the industry so are redefined rather than 
eliminated through emergence. The challenge for today is to further develop the 
analysis of the co-evolution of industries and their constituent firms. 
Lesson two comes from Young (1928) and tells us to look at the industry (in 
its relation to individual firms) and beyond to its connections with the rest of the 
economy for the driving mechanism of economic progress. This may be taken as a 
corollary to Marshall’s lesson on interdependence of firms and their industry. Young 
gives the industry a life independent of that of its constituent firms. This is an 
approach that has resonated with many evolutionary economists. For example, 
Malerba (2006, p. 18) refers to Young as providing a first discussion at a theoretical 
level of the co-evolution of vertically related industries due to the interdependence of 
the extent of the division of labour.  
Lesson three is from Steindl’s analysis and tells us to incorporate external 
constraints on firms into the analysis of dynamics of firms and industries. One 
constraint, the limited access that firms have to debt or equity finance for the 
expansion of productive capacity, comes from the broader economy but becomes 
industry specific through the mechanism of retained earnings as a source of internal 
finance. The second external constraint of limited demand for the industry’s products 
interacts with the finance constraint through Steindl’s ideal pattern of competition to 
provide for the co-evolution of firms and the industry, leading up a mature industry in 
which firms behave differently towards investment and pricing than during the ideal 
pattern of competition. 
Steindl’s account provides an example that falls into the evolutionary 
economics category of subset selection (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006). Firms are 
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selected on the basis of differential cost through firms with lower costs having faster 
growth rates and being able to survive aggressive price competition during the ideal 
pattern of competition. The reason for the differences in costs is not clearly explained 
by Steindl.  If the differences are due to a trait that is distributed over the group of 
firms, such as willingness (as discussed by Marshall and Young) to adopt and adapt to 
new vintages of capital produced elsewhere, generative selection can replace subset 
selection as variation in the trait occurs due the interaction of firms with their 
environment (the industry and beyond). Thus, Steindl’s analysis offers a base on 
which to fruitfully apply evolutionary theorizing in a context that includes the 
interaction of firms and industries.  
Lesson four comes from Penrose and tells us to consider the constraints on 
firm growth arising from within the firm, particularly limits to managerial capability. 
Importantly the internal constraints are associated with the imperfect knowledge 
within the firm as an organization. Means of organizing improve within the firm over 
time, allowing the firm to extend the scale and scope of its enterprise without adding 
to managerial resources. Knowledge flows are at the core of much evolutionary 
theorizing (Loasby, 1999 and 2002). Furthermore, the conception of the firm as 
having an internal structure that evolves through time has been taken up in formal 
evolutionary theorizing (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006). Penrose only deals vaguely 
with the industry concept, as she allows firms to transform their product and 
marketing orientation to escape markets that might otherwise constrain their growth. 
However, there is an implicit lesson that industries need to be construed broadly and, 








We proceed on the basis that evolutionary economists are not fully aware of the rich 
vein of economic analysis from Marshall, Young, Steindl and Penrose that deals with 
firms and industries empirically in an evolutionary spirit. We aim to draw attention to 
this work and to tease out some of its salient features that are particularly relevant to 
current developments in evolutionary theorizing. We hope that this encourages more 
researchers to treat firms and industries as interdependent and co-evolving. 
 Our concern in writing this paper is to plot the means by which evolutionary 
researchers have kept firms and industries as distinct foci, especially where pursuing 
mainly empirical research projects.  While industries comprise firms, they are not 
aggregations of firms because firms are a combination, even compromise, of 
internalizing and externalizing tendencies.  In short, industries comprise firms not 
because firms share common technology, managerial techniques or potential 
customers, but because these shared dimensions emerge through significant 
interactions and communications between firms, whether collaborative or 
competitive.   
 Our paper shows that researchers, even those who undertake research close to 
firms and in the spirit of Marshall’s evolutionary framing, deploy considerable 
discretion in stabilizing the relationship between firms and industries, thereby 
isolating one from the other. Firms are irreducibly heterogeneous because they have 
idiosyncratic histories and experiences, extending to their personnel.  Heterogeneity 
establishes notable and stimulating differences among firms, which is a basis for there 
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being an industry. A dominant analytical strategy for coping with difference is to 
convert heterogeneity to variety and then variation, which is found in Marshall’s 
construct of the representative firm, and in population thinking more generally. 
Marshall also employs the auxiliary or reinforcing assumptions of ‘the death of firms’ 
and the ‘localizing of firms’ in order to place meaningful bounds on variation. The 
theorists discussed in this paper have nascent systems theories and place the analytical 
distinction of (firm or industrial) system and its environment differently. For instance, 
Penrose focuses on heterogeneous firms and so considers relations among firms, 
which may form loose groupings or associations temporarily, informally. Young and 
Steindl group firms into industries and characterize their relationships in mundane 
terms, compared with activities that are of greater significance to the group which are 
presumed to be occurring elsewhere, in the poorly understood environment.   
 The above are largely negative conclusions in that they account for how 
researchers have used analytical devices to loosen the connection of firms and 
industries. In a positive sense, our paper suggests that evolutionary research should be 
redirected fundamentally at the question of firms’ boundaries. Given evolutionary 
interests in development and growth, firms’ boundaries lose their deterministic and 
foundational quality, which signify the existence of firms. Rather, corporate 
boundaries are recast as means of communication and interaction. The question facing 
firms is not so much where our boundaries are, but rather with whom do we share 
boundaries and how are the boundaries shared?  This leads to the question of how 











1 Firms focus their competitive efforts on selling or marketing their products to end 
users. Heterogeneity in firms’ productive capabilities can be reflected further in 
heterogeneous products, although of course there are many ways of making 
comparable products.  Consumers also cope with heterogeneous products in seeking 
to compare products.     
2 In attempting to translate heterogeneous firms in an industry empirically into a 
population of firms, we know that the ordering should be in the basis of average costs.  
In which case, the representative firm is something of a lagging indicator, suitable 
also for static or equilibrium analysis.  If Marshall’s emphasis were on growing firms 
ahead of the developing industry, surely more attention would be focussed on both the 
new entering firms and also on the exceptional long-lived firms that are enjoying 
internal economies, as indicated in the passage from Marshall, which we cite above. 
Metcalfe (2007b) provides an enlightening analysis of how the representative firm 
may be modelled to evolve in a manner capturing both the lagging and leading aspects 
of the concept. 
3 Marshall recognises that large firms can come to dominate industries: ‘The 
advantages which a large business has over a small one are conspicuous in 
manufacturing …. But there is a strong tendency for large establishments to drive out 
small ones in many other industries’ (Marshall, 1920, p. 297).  
4 Once the firm is treated in isolation it makes no sense to speak of the 
competitiveness of the firm, for competitiveness is a relational concept. This point 
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that is often lost in business school discussions developed from Penrose’s analysis of 
the growing firm.  The recent exchange between Rugman and Verbeke (2002) and 
Lockett and Thompson (2004) is instructive in this respect.  Rugman and Verbeke 
argue that Penrose provides little basis for ‘isolating mechanisms’, which they argue 
is integral to the resource-based view.  Locket and Thompson counter that Penrose’s 
approach is compatible with managers seeking to create and protect rents through 
isolating mechanisms. 
5 Raffaelli (2004, p. 210) argues that Marshall had a coherent and general theory of 
development or evolution, encompassing deliberative innovation and systemic 
selection and reproduction among innovations, embodied in repeatable or autonomous 
routines that exhibit tendencies of inertia. 
6 Pigou (1920, p. 790) acknowledges in a footnote that Marshall had in mind 
something more, such as a typical firm or firm of average size. However he argues 
that such complications are irrelevant to his purpose of analysing the industry supply 
curve using the equilibrium firm to stand for all firms. 
7 There are alternative neoclassical theories of the firm, particularly the theory due to 
Coase (1937), Williamson (1975) and Simon (1976) that relaxes the assumption of 
perfect knowledge and relates the boundaries of firm activity to transaction costs. 
However, this simply adds further external conditions, the degree of imperfect 
information and the costs of the technology for overcoming it, to the exogenous 
determinants of firm size.  
8 The modern representative firm or agent is a travesty since it relates to uniform 
agency, which is to say it is representative of itself – most odd. 
9 “Higher-order” is used in the sense of Menger (1976, p. 56): ‘a large number of 
other things in our economy that cannot be put in any direct causal connection with 
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the satisfaction of our needs, but which posses goods-character no less certainly than 
goods of first order.’ 
10 Metcalfe et al. (2006) draw on Young’s understanding of interdependence among 
industries in their emergent modelling of economic growth.   
11 The competitive group re-appears as a unit of analysis in Caves and Porter (1979) 
and influences strategy research thereafter.   
12 Marshall does this too, but in a descriptive rather than systemic sense. 
13 If innovations are embodied in capital goods, adoption may result in indivisibilities 
either in the form of minimum output scale for the equipment or the requirement that 
a whole production facility be redesigned to accommodate the new machines. 
14 Steindl’s argument concerning the relationship between the variance of return and 
the risk premium closely follows Kalecki's principle of increasing risk (Kalecki, 
1937). 
15 Steindl follows the standard practice of statistical agencies, particularly the US 
Census Bureau, and defines industries in terms of common or overlapping production 
technology. This definition is appropriate in terms of Steindl’s focus on scale and 
adoption of best-practice technology as sources of cost advantage for firms in an 
industry, but ignores potential competition between products with competing uses that 
are produced using different production technologies. 
16 This view of price rigidity as endemic with imperfect competition follows the 
arguments of Berle and Means (1932) on the prevalence of administered prices in big 
business. 
17 Internal accumulation also features prominently in the post-Keynesian analyses of 
Eichner (1976) and Harcourt and Kenyon (1976), in which dominant firms set their 
profit margins to generate sufficient retained profits to carry out their desired 
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investment in the expansion of productive capacity. However, causality differs from 
that in Steindl, where investment increases to the level set by the interaction of a rigid 
price with falling unit cost. In the post-Keynesian analyses, it is price that increases to 
the level required to finance desired investment expenditures, given the firm’s unit 
cost and demand for its product.  
18 This restrictive aspect of Steindl’s analysis is relaxed by Levine (1981) and Shapiro 
(1986), who consider innovation in terms of new product development as a means to 
overcoming a given growth rate of market demand for established products. Bloch 
(2006) considers the implications of new product development for Steindl’s analysis 
of the pattern of competition between progressive and marginal firms. 
19 See Sraffa (1926) for a discussion of alternative criteria for defining an industry. 
20 By contrast, Richardson (1975) in his essay on Adam Smith examines activities and 
capabilities in the context of industries.  He argues that economies of scale affect 
industries but possibly with differential effects on clusters of activities and 
capabilities within firm.  Hence, growth will encourage firms to specialize.  There 
may be tendencies towards concentration, but Richardson’s adopts an evolutionary 
perspective such that firm’s experiments in specializing continually interrupt these 
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